The general area of remote monitoring of computer systems encompasses a broad spectrum of mechanisms for a wide variety of purposes.
In this report, the discussion is restricted to monitoring systems or studies where a mechanism is used to measure or observe the performance of a computer system, and that mechanism can be controlled by another device or a human from some geographically distinct location.
In most cases, it is expected that the monitoring device itself is designed to collect data about the host system, perform at least preliminary filtering of the raw data, and then either store the filtered data for retrieval by the central controller or immediately transmit the filtered data to the central monitor controller. The nomenclature used for the various constituents, then, is as follows:
The host system is the installation being monitored; a monitor that is local to the host is referred to as a remote monitor .
The remote monitor is ultimately controlled from a central site by the central monitor controller. The host computer is considered to be the remote facility, while the measurement control and analysis take place at the central site.
This classification of remote monitors admits such approaches as: those implemented purely in software which can be interrogated from an external terminal, programmable hardware monitors, hardware monitors distributed over different portions of the host machine, hybrid monitors, monitors used in distributed computer networks, fault diagnosis monitors, and extended consoles for a computer system. Each of these categories will be discussed in detail in a later section of this report.
The classification excludes classic hardware monitors that require plugboard alterations to change the logical combination of probe signals.
It also excludes pure software-implemented monitors which use the normal operating system facilities for "triggering," reporting and recording.
Remote monitors are being used in a number of ways that earlier, locally controlled monitors were not used. The most obvious use of the monitors is for gathering performance data.
Remote performance monitor facilities are frequently divided into a number of remote data gathering mechanisms plus a single, shared facility to analyze data ggd prepare reports; the Tesdata facilities are examples of this type.
Distributed monitors, perhaps best exemplified by the PARTNER package for Control Data 6000 series machines, are also frequently used for performance measurements; the idea here is to dedicate certain hardware facilities of the host system to the measurement function. Programmable hardware monitors are merely a refinement of earlier hardware monitors, and also are primarily used for performance measurement.
A newer application of remote monitors is for computer system diagnosis and remote exercising of a computer system, A number of computer manufacturers have included this capability in their current product line. 5 A new area for which remotely controlled monitors might be employed is that of performance assurance and safeguard studies. The goal is to monitor the workload of a computer system in order to either assure a given level of performance, or to assure that a computer system is not being used for tasks that were not intended to be executed on that system.
Although it would be satisfying to be able to monitor a processor's program counter to determine what program the processor is executing, this is obviously impossible in the general case. It is easy to construct an example that shows that if one could write an algorithm that inspects the program counter locus and identifies a corresponding algorithm, then one ought to be able to write a similar algorithm that inspects the program counter locus and indicates whether the corresponding algorithm will ever terminate or ragt. The latter algorithm has been proven to be impossible to construct.
Nevertheless, there are other activities in the computer system that can be observed with a monitor, e.g. resouce utilization. One can easily compute the ratio of input/output time to central processor time for a given job. This will allow one to partition heavy computer jobs from input/output bound jobSo Although it is impossible to identify arbitrary programs in execution, it may be possible to recognize a small set of programs when they are executing on the host system. For example, suppose that an installation is intended to only execute programs P, , P^... P (on arbitrary data).
It may be possible to employ heuristic technique? to recognize exactly when one program from that set executes, while any unrecognizable program is declared to be illegal.
In this case, remote monitoring techniques can be used to recognize the "signature" of each of the n acceptable programs.
Finally, remote monitors may be used to enhance system security or to provide a mechanism for checking the security of a system.
It is clear that the presence of monitors of any type are a threat to the overall security of a computer system, e.g. see references 6 and 13. Whenever a mechanism (i.e. a monitor) is provided the capability of observing critical portions of the operating system, then that same device can be maliciously employed to penetrate the conventional security mechanisms of that system.
By partitioning a monitor into a local internal component and a remote external component, system security has a much better chance of being effective, ".'he internal monitor can be written as an internal portion of the operating system itself, subject to the same design constraints (such as proof of correctness, restricted entry points, authorized access, etc.) as other modules. The attendant software is essentially data-gathering code, which is simpler and easier to make secure than a full software monitor.
The external portion of the monitor is allowed to access the internal portion through normal, secure paths, thus allowing authorization checks and entries into predefined procedures of the operating system. Although this approach is not totally secure, it offers a much more effective security policy than undisciplined monitoring of the host system.
Another variant of remote monitors can be used to audit a computer system's security state. The basic idea is to distribute a monitor of internal and external components, as above. The external portion is used interactively by a human that is responsible for system security to audit various portions of the machine with the aid of the internal portion of the monitor.
This approach is used in the WWMCCS computer systems, and will be discussed at length in the body of this report. The Rand Corporation has also investigated the use of monitors to detect data bank intrusions and to delay the intruder until other protective action can be taken.^-Î n the remainder of this report the background of remote monitoring will first be examined. The evolution of present-day monitoring systems will be traced from early performance monitoring work. The main body of this report is the next section; seven categories of remote monitors are defined, and a number of examples of each category are discussed. The final section draws some conclusions about capabilities and limitations for various application areas and looks briefly at future trends in remote monitoring.
BACKGROUND
In this section of the report, the evolution of remote monitors is discussed beginning with hardware and software monitors of the [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] era.
In the early 1970's monitoring techniques and tools became substantially more sophisticated, leading to the development of mechanisms that could be construed as remote monitors. This section will briefly describe this evolution into current remote monitoring technology.
Computer system monitoring has become a primary component of system design, manufacture, and maintenance because of its application to performance evaluation. Although testing instruments (e.g. oscilloscopes) were frequently used to monitor the hardware at a very low level, system monitoring did not really begin to be needed until the mid 1960's.
In the early part of that decade, computer systems began to reach a level of sophistication where resources were shared among a set of users. Once resource sharing was introduced, then resource utilization became an important metric for that system.
If utilization was too high, then the resource represented a bottleneck to system progress; if utilization was too low, then the resource was either over-configured or, perhaps, was being prevented from being used effectively by bottlenecks elsewhere in the system.
The result was frantic activity in the areas of hardware and software monitor development. 4 Software Monitors Software monitors have not changed significantly in the last ten to fifteen years, although the designs have become more intricate. The predominante idea behind a software monitor is that the operating system of the host machine is modified so that it will collect and save measurement data about the performance of the machine. There are three major techniques for implementing a software monitor (discussed at length elsewhere).'''^" The first technique is to use the system log as a storage medium for recording the occurrence of events. The system log may subsequently be analyzed to determine the activity of the machine at a level dictated by the post processor and the raw data recorded on the system log.
This approach has proven to be a cost-effective mechanism for performance monitoring at a gross level For more detailed studies, a more sophisticated data-gathering tool must be employed.
The system log cannot normally be used to trace the program counter locus.
In these cases, more extreme modifications must be made to the host operating system in order to invoke specially written monitoring and recording code.
One technique to do this is the interruptintercept method.
This technique assumes that the only times at which measurements should be taken are when the system changes states.
In an interrupt-driven operating system, (e.g. IBM's OS) state changes are initiated by an interrupt (or a trap).
At each such occurrence, the CPU is restarted on a handler, usually as a function of the type of interrupt. The interrupt-intercept monitor modifies this interrupt address so that pertinent interrupts are directed to monitoring code rather than to the handler.
The monitoring code records the event and then branches to the handler.
The raw data is subsequently recorded on a mass storage device and analyzed offline.
(IBM has successfully used the technique in OS measurements,^^as did GE in the GCOS operating system, as well as others.
)
While interrupt-intercept monitors can be used successfully to monitor events correlated with an interrupt or a trap, they cannot be successfully used in a machine which does not incorporate an interrupt-driven operating system (e.g. Control Data Cyber machines) . An alternative is to use random time intervals for invoking the measurement routines; this technique has been used in many different cases, e.g. see references 24 and 54.
Software monitors have several assets, including their ability to be implemented without modifying existing hardware. Unfortunately, they do tend to add time and space artifact to the host system, producing a halo effect to the measurement experiment. The resolution of a software monitor is always limited by the instruction repertoire and cycle time of the host machine. A software monitor may also be corrupted or bypassed by processes that do not wish to be monitored.
Hardware Monitors
The development of hardware monitors lagged that of software monitors by 5 a few years, at least in the public domain.
Drummond discusses several, hardware monitors that were used internally at IBM on the 7094 systems,'' while customers were still making crude attempts at monitoring in the late 1960's.48 ind ependent vendors began constructing special -purpose hardware monitors in [1967] [1968] , propagating a large number of such firms. Currently, only two such firms still exist (i.eo have any significant portion of the market) --Comten and Tesdata.
Early hardware monitors consisted of three major components: a signal filter and combination unit, a time and count unit, and a data recording unit.
The signal filter and combination unit was usually made up of a set of high impedance probes which could be attached to the logic boards of the host machine without disturbing the existing electronic signals on those logic boards.
The signals sensed by the probes were passed to a logical combination unit, which could be used to detect the simultaneous occurrence of two or more probe signals, the exclusive occurrence of one signal from among a set of signals, etc. The particular logical combinations chosen were "programmed into" the hardware monitor by conventional plugboard logic.
Once an event, or a logical combination of events, had been detected, the occurrence or duration of that event was temporarily recorded in the time and count unit. This unit was ordinarily implemented as a set of addressable registers, although more sophisticated monitors began to incorporate content addressable memories.-^' Inasmuch as these registers were accumulating data, they were subject to overflow; therefore, their contents were frequently stored on the data recording unit (usually a tape drive).
Hardware monitors of the generation described above had the ability to take measurements of a computer system at a much finer resolution than any software monitor; furthermore, they created no time and space artifact.
The monitors were also not reachable from any software in the host machine; hence, they were protected from corruption and/or bypassing. However, it was difficult to draw a correspondence between observed monitor data and a particular task or procedure executing on the host system, i.e. causal relationships were lost. The amount of raw data collected also tended to be too large for reasonable offline analysis (and online storage).
Thusj the strengths of pure hardware monitors were the weaknesses of software monitors, and vice versa.
Intelligent Monitors
The first significant step in the direction of improving the chasm between software and hardware monitoring techniques turns in the general direction of remote monitoring (as discussed in this report). The monitor might be distributed across special -purpose measurement hardware and software internal to the host operating system.
In 1967, Estrin et al. published a paper describing the SNUPER COMPUTER monitoring system proposed for facilities at UCLA. 12 The SNUPER COMPUTER system was a complete system based around a SDS (XDS) Sigma 7 processor with 16K of 32-bit memory.
The input to the processor was from a "sensory system" via normal data channels and high-speed I/O pathSo The sensory system design would ultimately include a filtering processor to analyze raw monitor 6 data, generate event counts and measure the duration of events. Details of the design for SNUPER COMPUTER components were never published; and, apparently, the entire instrumentation system was never operational. Nevertheless, this paper was the first published report of a sophisticated monitoring system in which the instrumentation facility was centered around a programmable processing unit, allowing the hardware monitor to dynamically control a measurement session.
Drummond indicates that IBM was using one computer to measure anothec.,in the early 1960's with the Direct Couple (7040-7090) system.'''^P '^^'T he general state-of-the-art in the late 1960's began to see intelligent hardware monitors which employed a simplified version of the SNUPER COM-PUTER approach.
These monitors were still pure hardware monitors in which the static measurement experiment was determined a priori. However, a processor (usually a minicomputer) was employed to logically combine event signals, to manage event counters and timers in software, to provide a programmable filter for raw performance data, and to control the data recording function.
Additionally, such hardware monitors typically provided online displays to describe the state of the host machine in real time.
(Notice that this point of evolution essentially corresponds to the use of a remote monitor as a system console as mentioned in the Introduction.)
During this period of development, most of the hardware components had been incorporated into monitors so that they could interact with host system software; but, for a few years, the monitors were not used in that manner.
Once a programmable monitor is used to query the status of the host in order to dynamically control the monitoring function, that monitoring system has, in effect, become a remote monitoring system. The control element corresponds to the minicomputer-based monitor, and the remote portion of the monitor is that part of the host system which passes information to the external monitor. These applications of minicomputerbased hardware monitors are discussed in detail in the next section of this report. This characterization of remote monitors admits to imprecision in the sense that many remote monitors could be classified into two or more of the named divisions; and, in fact, several particular studies will be mentioned under more than one category. The remainder of this section is made up of more detailed discussions of the above-mentioned categories.
REMOTE MONITORING TECHNIQUES

Remotely Controlled Software Monitors
A remotely controlled software monitor can be implemented as simply as a system log monitor. The purpose of the monitor is limited only by the ingenuity of the impl ementers , e"g. it may monitor the CPU utilization, inspect resource utilization, etc.
In a pure software monitor, the monitor is instigated, for a particular run, by an operator, a system clock, or it is set for cyclic invocation at system initiation time.
A remotely controlled software monitor is triggered by a central monitor controller. There are two prominent examples of actual implementations which employ this technique: the first example is the WWMCCS ADP System Security Officer (WASSO) station, 29j42 gp^^1^^second example is a technique used on Control Data computers.^^'
The WASSO station potentially could be implemented as a true remotely controlled software monitor, or as a monitor distributed between a software tool and an intelligent terminal; the former case is discussed in this section.
Most sites in the WWMCCS are centered around a Honeywell 6000 series computer under the GCOS III operating system. Each site is potentially processing sensitive data in a multiprogramming environment; thus, there is a need for a secure operating policy in the system.
Each such site has at least one ADP System Security Officer whose mission is to monitor the physical protocol of the site, as well as the internal operation of the system.
The WASSO station is under development to aid the officer in the latter part of his mission by providing a facility to implement collection, reduction, and analysis of information necessary to assess the site's security posture.
The current status of the WASSO study is that a prototype system is being built, and this prototype will partially rely on the standard software tools that exist in the operating system. The GCOS III operating system has been declared to be inadequate to support the desired security policies necessary for WWMCCS; thus, a new operating system will ultimately be designed and, presumably, that operating system will incorporate new software monitoring tools. The current software tools include facilities to designate one time sharing terminal as a "master terminal" to be used by the WASSO.
From this master terminal, one can monitor system status information, line and terminal control tables, as well as inspect all interactions between the computer and an interactive user. The WASSO can also inspect memory utilization, mass storage utilization and file organization via the batch stream (i.e. offline analysis similar to system log analysis).
A number of other standard measurement tools are available to the WASSO, all of which are implemented as conventional software monitors. The proposed WASSO station distributes some of the monitoring function onto a tailor-made intelligent terminal. This extension to the facilities of the WASSO clearly puts the mechanism into the class of hybrid monitors; however, it will be discussed in this section for the sake of continuity (and then cross-referenced in later sections).
The WASSO station incorporates a set of monitor data I/O buffers, a processor to analyze data and a full set of peripherals used to report and record monitor data. The station is expected to be implemented on a Honeywell Level 6 minicomputer system, including 48K words of memory, diskettes, magnetic tape, card reader, line printer, a cartridge disk unit, and the console.
Functionally, the station will maintain system access controls, alter job priorities, explicitly interconnect the Honeywell 6000 node into the WWMCCS network and handle detected security breaches. The critical observation here is that, again, host software is used to actually collect the data used for determining the activity of the host computer system. Control Data employs pure software techniques in a manner that is unique due to the architecture of their Cyber series systems. A detailed description of the technique perhaps best belongs in the section on internally distributed monitors, since it employs a peripheral processor to monitor the state of the remainder of the machine. The aspect of the work that makes it appropriate for this section is that software monitoring of a host system can be initiated and controlled from a central site, while the data collection and analysis are performed at the remote site by (a portion of) the host system itself. See the next section for the technical description.
Another example of remotely controlled software monitoring was implemented at MIT in the late 1960's.
The monitor probes, and parts of the filtering and analysis, were implemented in the host system software, while online displays, further analysis, and data recording were implemented on a central site minicomputer, A discussion of this study introduces the subsection on hybrid monitors.
Remotely controlled software monitoring can be a cost-effective method for implementing a remote monitoring facility in certain situations.
If the environment of the host system is "friendly," then the likelihood of a successful implementation for performance evaluation or diagnostic testing is good.
However, if the goal of monitoring is performance assurance or system security, pure software techniques may be unsuccessful due to the well-known complexity of software in the present day and age. Even in an apparantly friendly environment (i"e. there is no need for performance assurance nor security enforcement), it is almost certain that the software monitor can be bypassed and/or violated.
(Although there is no proof that the above statement is true, this author knows of no completely secure software system.)
In a potentially unfriendly environment, the probability of successfully implementing a completely safe remotely controlled software monitor is vanishing, no matter what the reason for monitoring.
Internally Distributed Monitors
An internally distributed monitor employs portions of the host's hardware in conjunction with (possibly) special -purpose software to monitor the operation of the host itself.
If means are provided by which a user can remotely stimulate the internally distributed monitor, then it can be characterized as a remote monitoro (The distinction between remotely controlled software monitors and internally distributed monitors is not well-defined; similarly, hybrid monitors and some internally distributed monitors bear strong similarities.) Ordinarily, only machines with multiple processors can provide a hardware environment for implementing internally distributed monitors; however, note that the multiple processors need not be homogeneous.
A number of different domestic companies incorporate multiple processors into their product line (e.g. Digital Equipment PDP 10 series computers. Control Data Cyber series computers, Univac 1100 series computers.) There have also been some machines modified by individual research organizations so that they can support internal distributed monitoring, e.g. see references 20 and 34" The approach used for internally distributing a monitor is a simple one: One processor of the host system is temporarily reserved for use as a hardware monitor processor, while the remaining processors are employed by the host in a conventional manner^The detached processor simulates the action of the signal filter and combination unit, the time and count unit, and the analysis and recording unit of a conventional hardware monitor.
The primary failing of the simulation is that hardware probes are ordinarily not used to gather data for the simulated hardware monitor. Instead, software executes in other parts of the host, as well as in the detached processor, to perform the data gathering function. The Control Data 6000 series machines include one or two central processing units (CP's) and ten peripheral processing units (PR's).
A CP is used for 60-bit general purpose computation while each PP can be used as an independent 12-bit processor to perform I/O operations, implement the heart of the executive and control the system displayo CP-PP communication takes place through the central memory of the machine; the machine state is also maintained in the central memory.
The orthodox mode of operation for the overall machine intends for user (application) programs to execute on a CP, where general purpose computations can be implemented under high level language program control. Whenever the operating system needs to intervene with the user processing, or whenever the appl ication program needs to perform an I/O operation, then that activity is executed on a PP. Thus, the PP's are used for welldefined operations such that PP programs are written, assembled, and tested well before they are eligible for use by a CP program.
PP programs extend the hardware, providing a virtual machine environment for user processes that execute on a CP.
(PP programs can only be loaded from the system library of PP programs; thus, a user cannot redefine his own PP routines to perform I/O, etc")
The architecture lends itself well to internally distributed monitoring. A special PP program to gather data, filter, combine, analyze, and record monitor observations can be written and added to the system library; thus, a PP simulates a hardware monitor with probes into the machine state tables in the central memory.
For this architecture, the remainder of the host software and hardware need not be altered, since a PP loaded with the specially-written monitor program needs no other facility to monitor the host.
Internally distributed monitoring techniques can be extremely cost-effective in many circumstances. The cost in additional hardware is non-existent in these machines, since parts of a distributed system are used to implement the monitor itself.
In some studies that are classified as internally distributed monitors, special purpose hardware has been permanently added to a production machine, see references 20 and 34. As a performance monitor, the approach is ideal except in the case of a system running under processor saturation (hence, a needed resource is removed from the system in order to observe that system).
Performance data on program counter distributions can be easily obtained in the Control Data environment (but is much more difficult in the PDP 10 or Univac 1100 environment).
Since system tables are stored in a central memory where all processors may inspect them, then machine state is easy to record and analyze; this allows the pseudo hardware monitor to identify causal relationships. 11 As a diagnostic testing device, the approach also has considerable merit. The pseudo hardware monitor can be used to run diagnostic programs and observe the results.
If the application of a monitor is either performance monitoring or diagnostic testing, internally distributed monitoring techniques lend themselves well to remote monitoring.
Control Data currently employs this technique for "Remote Technical Assistance" for customer engineers at the site of the host.
The monitor is stimulated by interactive terminals through the conventional time sharing facilities of the host machine.
As a performance assurance or system security remote monitor, the application of internally distributed monitors is less attractive, since the overall operation of the device is ultimately controlled by softwareo Again, if one could ensure that complex software systems can be proven correct and that they cannot be bypassed or violated, then one might be less skeptical of these applications of internally distributed monitors. The current state of software engineering cannot guarantee that either of these conditions are satisfied.
Programmable Hardware Monitors
Programmable hardware monitors were introduced in the background section of this report; they are characterized as hardware monitors in which the operation of the monitor is programmable and, thus, dynamically reconfigurable as a function of the monitoring environment.
In order for a programmable hardware monitor to be classified as a remote monitor, then either the programmable portion of the monitor must be located at the central site, or else the programmable monitor must be able to be controlled from the central site.
This form of hardware monitor is, by far, the most popular type at the current time (e.g. see references 27 , 60, and 61). The separation of hybrid monitors from programmable hardware monitors is also somewhat arbitrary.
Sperry Univac has been heavily involved in the use of programmable hardware monitors for at least ten years.
In 1969, a paper was published describing an 1108 monitoring system in which a major component of the monitor was a second 1108 system;38 currently, the Univac Eagan Benchmark Facility uses a comprehensive online monitoring system which heavily relies on a Univac 1616 minicomputer,^'^^The earlier system was composed of three components: a hardware monitor to gather data from the host, data collection software used by the controller system to record data from the hardware monitor, and data reduction software to analyze the collected data.
The initial goal for this system was modest, namely to provide a profile of the program counter contents; however, the tools that were developed are clearly of a much wider range of applicability than mentioned in the paper.
The hardware monitor component (i.e. the remote monitor) was simple circuitry to detect unconditional branch instruction executions and to record the program counter contents.
A critical observation is that the remote monitor ran at the same clock cycle as the host 12 CPU; and, in fact, was driven off of the same power supply and clock as the host system.
(The remote monitor was mounted on a single card rack inside the host.) Data collection was accomplished by a distinct 1108 system, with remote monitor inputs arriving via a channel, subsequently being recorded on drums private to the controlling system. Monitor data were subsequently moved onto magnetic tapes before analysis.
At first impression, the use of an 1108 as a central site controller seems to be a case of overkill.
However, one should note that the combination of central and remote monitor is potentially operating at the cycle time of the host; and, hence, the 1108 controller may be required in order to record all data that were measured.
The Univac Eagan Benchmark Facility^'^^monitor is composed of a data collection module, a BMD-1100 system, online displays, and an operator interface.
A similar facility has been built for the Univac London Benchmark Facility.* The purpose of these facilities is to provide online monitoring displays of a wide variety so that potential customers can see the effect of their workload on the benchmark machine Monitor data can be transferred into the BMD-llOO system via an I/O channel about once every second.
The BMD-llOO (Telecon) component is capable of building real time color displays, "replaying" sketches of a benchmark run with different displays, interacting with the user, etc.
It incorporates a Univac 1616 minicomputer (750 ns, 16-bit memory), a tape drive and a cartridge disk. The present uses of the 1616 minicomputer requires only about 10 percent of the CPU cycles to accomplish data collection and display.
The online displays at the Eagan facility include a large color CRT display with a wide variety of display options, a digital display of certain critical elements of the host system's status, and a U-100 CRT terminal to provide an operator's interface.
The current implementations at Eagan and London use the facility as a local hardware monitor; however, either facility is well -suited as a remote monitoring system with no hardware modification.
Inasmuch as the * The BMD-llOO system is replaced by a Univac Telecon system. The Telecon system is a standard front end processor for telecommunication applications, where the principal processing is carried out by a Univac 1616 minicomputer; it is similar to the special -purpose BMD-llOO system. processing element is actually an interactive front end processor, it is obvious that the instrumentation hardware and Telecon front end can be employed as a remote monitor, while the displays and operator's interface are implemented at the central site.
Notice that the Telecon processor already includes appropriate hardware and software for interacting between the operator's interface and the remote processor. Although such an installation relies on a partial software solution (at the remote site), a secure implementation might employ ROM for storing Telecon programs, with RAM used as buffer space.
The data collection and forwarding codes ought to be simple enough to be made convincingly correct.
Texas Instruments employed an in-house programmable hardware monitor system during the development of their ASC system.^3 , 44, 45, 62, 63 jhe reason for building this monitor was performance evaluation. The Texas Instruments System Activity Monitor (TISAM) design was motivated in part by the need for a flexible hardware monitor which could provide a good monitoranalyst interface. The main component of the system is a TI 960A minicomputer system with a card reader, magnetic tape, and interactive (hard copy) terminal.
Although the system is capable of performing a wide variety of measurement tasks, it has been used primarily for program counter tracing.
There are a number of other programmable hardware monitors reported on in the open literature, e.g. see reference 3. However, the above discussion adequately discusses the approach that one might use in applying the technique to remote monitoring.
Programmable hardware monitors appear to offer significant promise as remote monitors for most application areas considered in this report. As remote performance monitors, the approach has already been successfully used for as long as ten years.
The intelligent console applications (discussed later in the report) are a variant of programmable hardware monitors, and also have been successfully employed as remote diagnostic testing toolSo
As performance assurance monitors, the picture is not quite so clear; this area has not yet been successfully accomplished (to this author's knowledge).
However, for performance assurance applications, the use of the programmable hardware monitor at either the local or remote site seems to have a better chance at remaining secure than either of the previous two approaches.
Since the remote portion of the monitor can be simple, its programs can be simple, and physically protected by storing the code in ROM and/or physically sealing the monitor.
In this latter case, RAM memory might be loaded only with some special apparatus, which itself may be geographically distinct from the remote monitor. As a system security monitor, it is apparent that this general approach is being used in the WASSO terminal described in a previous subsection.
Hybrid Monitors
The di stinction between hybrid monitors and programmable hardware monitors is principally one of application; the components for many programmable hardware monitors are sufficient to perform hybrid monitorinq. A hybrid monitor is composed of a software portion that executes on the host hardware, and a hardware portion that executes a (usually programmable) hardware monitor. The two portions are cognizant of one another and exchange signals and data. Thus, a hybrid monitor reacts to the state of the host system by reconfiguring itself dynamically.
It is easy to argue that the proposed WASSO terminal and the BMD-1100 systems, as well as others, are really hybrid monitors.
One early application of the hybrid monitor is a remote tool was given by Grochow in his graduate work at MIT.^' The Graphic Display Monitoring System (GDM) was designed to observe activity in the GE 645-Multics system developed at Project MAC. The monitoring functions were distributed across a remotely controlled software monitor and a central site programmable facility. The host software portion of the monitor executed as a multics procedure, gathering data from static operating system tables. This procedure was also capable of preliminary filtering of the data and transmission of the partially filtered data to the central site programmable device. The software portion was driven by commands from the central site machine over one data path, and a separate data path was used for monitor data transmission. The host machine central site facility interface was implemented via two data channels on the GE 645 to a 2400 baud modem, through a telecommunications link to a similar modem at the central site.
The central site mechanism was composed of a DEC PDP 8 system including a disk, magnetic tape and a display processor. The central site portion of the system used much of its computing capability to format real time displays, such as the usage of Multics core memory pages, the multi -programming state of each process in the system, etc. These analysis and display programs existed in the basic library of functions of GDM. However, the GDM was also user programmable so that monitor functions and displays could be generated whenever new, or unique, requirements were encountered.
The GDM was found to be useful in its flexibility and extensibility. The software portion of the monitor was constructed as a sampling monitor, with the sampling rate determined by requests from the PDP 8 (thus, the sample rate was taken as a function of the display being used). The 2400 baud transmission rate for host-PDP 8 interconnection allowed for a maximum of about 20 samples per second, although many displays were changed only once a second.
In 1971, Aschenbrenner, Amiot, and Natarajan published a paper briefly describing their Neurotron monitor system (implemented at Argonne National Laboratory).^The monitor incorporates a minicomputer to control the combination and filer unit, as well as data filtering and recording. The external monitor and the host software monitor interact via conventional I/O ports, as well as through measurement probes. The development goals of Neurotron offer several interesting facets to the use of the system for remote monitoring.
Among Perhaps the most interesting claim made about the Neurotron is the portability of the hardware to different systems, each containing a host software monitor. Apparently, a single hardware monitor can be constructed that will successfully operate with a variety of host systems.
In the late 1960's and early 1970's Xerox Data Systems was deeply involved in measurement projects for operating systems and the Sigma series hardware.
Hughes and Cronshaw describe another hybrid monitor that was used within XDS. 21 The ADAM hybrid monitor differs little from the Neurotron monitor in its organization; the facility incorporated a minicomputer in the hardware monitor.
Interactions between the host and the hardware monitor took place over an I/O channel, while the hardware monitor could also collect data from probes installed on the host. The most significant differences between the ADAM and the Neurotron were in the event recognition algorithms and their versatility. ADAM used an associative memory to quickly recognize event combinations; secondly, the Xerox system was intended only to monitor the Sigma 7, while the Neurotron was aimed at a variety of different host systems.
The technology of hybrid monitors corresponds closely to that of programmable hardware monitors. The strong points of each are similar; e.g. careful design of the remote portion of a hybrid or programmable hardware monitor is likely to be more "trustworthy" than for pure software techniques that execute solely on the host hardware.
Network Monitors
Network monitors are defined to be any monitoring device used in the context of a distributed computer network. The primary motivation for monitoring in The standard ARPANET remote monitor is really a software monitor implemented on an IMP, but under the control of the Network Control Center.
Another view of the facility is that it is functionally equivalent to the Univac Telecon monitoring facility discussed earlier; i,e. the IMP corresponds to a Univac Telecon front end processor (Univac 1616 minicomputer).
Another monitor has also been developed for investigating an alternate packet switching mechanism ("packet radio systems").^'
In this discussion a packet radio repeater, rather than an IMP, is used to broadcast packets with a radio transceiver.
The packet radio repeater also includes a microprocessor to aid in the broadcast and to act as a monitoring facility.
In order to avoid the halo effect of broadcasting the measurement data over the normal data channel, monitor data is saved at the station until the measurement experiment is completed.
It may then be transmitted to a central facility for further processing. Another interesting aspect of the work is that the packet radio repeater microprocessor does not maintain a local library of monitoring routines; instead, whenever a measurement test is to be initiated, the monitoring code is transmitted to the packet radio repeater"
In the case of performance assurance and system security monitors, this idea has obvious interesting possibil ities.
A final note on ARPANET remote monitoring is concerned with measurements of the London node of the network. 50 a PDP 9 is used to collect measurement data on the IBM 360/195 and then analyzed as batch data after the data collection phase.
Considerable thought has gone into the topic of remote monitors for networks at the University of Waterloo.-^' At the time that the paper was published, the group had built a prototype Computer Network Monitoring System (CNMS) designed to: -observe network performance -detect malfunctions in the network -diagnose failures A basic premise of the measurement group was that software monitors, alone, often produced too much artifact (cf. ARPANET studies), and that pure hardware monitors were not sufficiently flexible to make the required network measurements. Therefore, a hybrid monitor design would be used. The general approach dictated that each host computer should include a remote monitor to be software controlled from the network monitoring center. 17 The important components of the CNMS are a remote controlled hybrid monitor (RCHM) and the central site network measurement center (NMC as in the ARPANET).
RCHM's are potentially allowed to communicate with the NMC either through the normal network data paths or through dedicated links. The philosophy also admits to a hierarchy of measurement centers; e.g. each RCHM could be controlled by a regional NMC (RNMC) which is, in turn, controlled by the NMC.
The prototype RCHM is based on a PDP 11 (probably an LSI-11) processor with extra hardware to implement a combination and filter unit and an event recognition unit.
RCHM is attached to the host computer with probes and through the conventional I/O communication lines of the host. The PDP 11 system includes a small disk for buffering raw data, which can be forwarded to a (R)NMC in a condensed form.
The software portion of an RCHM is distributed across the PDP 11 CPU and the CPU of the host computer.
Host resident monitor code is systemdependent with system-independent interfaces (between the RCHM-resident software and the host-resident software). The RCHM-resident software is organized as a set of six classes of processes, functions of the classes The (R)NMC system is not a special-purpose computer system (although it must have a hardware facility to communicate with the set of RCHM's that it controls).
The (R)NMC software contains seven classes of processes that roughly complement the six classes of RCHM processes; the seventh class establishes a user interface with the analyst who controls the experiment.
An instance of a measurement experiment in CNMS might proceed as follows: The purpose of the experiment is carefully analyzed, and a set of measurements that will provide the necessary results is determined. The RCHM's are then configured to take the required measurements by attaching hardware probes, designing and implementing host software probes, and designing and implementing RCHM-resident data collection and reduction software.
Since each RCHM hardware system is identical, one set of software is written for all remote monitors. The codes should be able to collect bursts of measurement data from the hardware and software probes, record the data, condense the data (usually to a histogram) and then transmit the condensed monitor data to the controlling (R)NMC.
Once the monitors have been defined, the experiment can be initiated from the NMCo Online control can be exercised by the analyst via the user interface manager that executes on the NMC. The interaction is possible because of real-time analysis and display at the NMC. After an experiment is initiated in the RCHM's, there is no requirement that the analyst continue to monitor the experiment from the NMC; the communication between RCHM's and the {R)NMC need not be continuous.
Upon conditions determined by the NMC or the analyst, the experiment can be terminated.
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center has also developed monitoring tools for investigating their internal network.^" The network connects a number of minicomputers and at least one medium-scale computer system. Each of the minicomputer systems can be loaded with a remotely controlled software monitor. The monitoring facility provides standard software for recording data and for transmitting it to other nodes on the network. The work is similar to the facilities provided in the ARPANET, and not nearly as wel 1 -developed as those described in the CNMS.
Tesdata Systems Corporation has two particular monitor systems that can be classified as network monitors. The MSB facility is a product, aimed at smal 1 -to-medium sized data centers, for sharing more sophisticated and expensive monitoring equipment with other centers of similar size.^T he approach taken in the MSB is to install a programmable hardware monitor at each remote site.
The hardware monitor is based on a 16-bit microprocessor with RAM for buffer storage and a fixed set of (not more than 64) standard hardware probes.
At intervals of time determined by the measurement sampling rate, a central site controller initiates communication with the remote monitor to dump the remote buffers.
Data collected by the central controller may or may not have been filtered by the remote microprocessor. The remote monitor is designed with ROM and RAM memory. The ROM contains several built-in functions for the microprocessor, while the RAM is used for buffering and dynamic portions of the monitor code. The RAM portion of the microprocessor is down loaded from the central site controlling processor.
Central site computing, performed at a regional control center, produces summary reports on a conventional computer system.
The distributed measurement network is a production facility of Tesdata.
The network consists of several secondary systems made up of conventional Tesdata monitors, e.g. MS 38 or MS 58 monitor systems, and a single primary system implemented as an MS 88 monitor system. The secondary systems are connected to the primary system via standard voice grade phone lines, and are controlled by the MS 88 system. The differences between the distributed measurement network and the MSB are quite significant.
The secondary systems can operate as autonomous monitors or be a node in a monitoring network.
Each secondary system contains complete data collection and archiving equipment, analysis programs, and reporting mechanisms. An Remote monitoring of a single computer system is merely a degenerate case of network monitoring. As remote monitors for performance evaluation, network monitors are already in production, e.g. Tesdata facilitieSo The CNMS system additionally uses network monitoring techniques for providing a diagnostic testing facility. Applications in the areas of performance assurance and system security are not tested (even for local systems, performance assurance and system security have not been successfully implemented) " Of all the remote monitoring classifications discussed up to this point, it is easiest to argue for the probability of a successful implementation using these techniques.
In performance assurance and system security applications, critical questions of the monitoring activity are the independence of the remote monitor from the host and the validity of the remote monitor. The possibility of build ing logically compact hybrid remote monitors which can be proven correct offers some hope for the latter question; the use of ROM for storing remote software also aids in ensuring validity of the monitor.. Distributing the remote monitor across hardware and software aids in creating indep endence between the host and the remote monitor. These factors are an obvious point for further research.
Fault Diagnosis Monitors
Much work has been done in the area of fault-tolerant computing, especially in the area of circuit verification. A fault-tolerant computer system is one in which a single error will not cause the system to fail; the overall system can detect and correct the error.
Some obvious examples of fault detection monitoring occur in fault-tolerant computers such as in-flight or on-board computer systems.
Unfortunatly, most work in the area of fault diagnosis is at a rather detailed level. Hardware faults usually occur at the gate level; hence, monitoring equipment must gather data at that level " Thus, fault diagnosis monitors tend to gather such detailed information that the data is only useful for circuit analysis or redundant processing (e.g. see reference 10) and is not generally useful for system level monitoringo One special-purpose diagnostic facility that has been employed in industry is the Control Data STAR Maintenance Station.^' Although the mainten-[ ance station appears to be at least as applicable of a diagnosis tool as the PP in the 6000 series machines. Control Data personel indicate that it has not been a useful addition to the STAR facil ities.^2 0 Related work takes place in other areas of hardware-diagnosis using extended system consoles, and that work will be discussed in the next subsection.
Intelligent and Extended Consoles
The final category of remote monitors uses the notion of the intelligent terminal for an operator's console,.
It is frequently useful to provide more capability in the operator's console than exists in a passive terminal; e.g., the console can be used to drive CRT displays in parallel with the operation of all other facilities in the host system.
The oldest application of the technique must be that of the Control Data 6600 consoleo^'^One of the ten peripheral processors is dedicated to the task of driving the dual CRT system console. The PP reads input from the operator's keyboard and from the machine's central memory, and processes the data to produce CRT displays describing the state of the operating system.
The Honeywell Remote Maintenance System/62 (RMS-62) is a small system tool to aid field engineers in monitoring, controlling, diagnosing, and patching Level 62 installations.^^'^^The remote portion of the device is a Remote Console Interface Adaptor and a software diagnostic package. The adaptor is a single board component which provides a 300 baud modem to send/receive information to/from the host. The modem is attached to the bus connecting the host system and its console. When the host is experiencing problems, the adaptor is connected to a central site system console via voice grade phone lines.
Diagnostic software is then exercised from the central site.
Digital Equipment Corporation has announced a facility, similar to the RMS-62, for use with their PDPll/70.47 Few details of the work are available since the project is still under proprietory development. However, the adaptor contains, not only a modem for communicating with the central controller, but also a microprocessor with a small amount of RAM, The unit is to be used only for diagnostic testing. One difference between the RMS-62 and the DEC system is that the DEC facility allows communication with either the host's local operator console or the central site; in the latter case, the microprocessor is required to do some console processing at the site of the host.
Digital Equipment personnel speculate that the facility is too slow to be used as a performance monitor and will only be used as a diagnostic facility.
The Cray system also employs an intelligent operator's console in its standard configuration.^^The console is driven by a Data General Eclipse minicomputer (a 400 nanosecond, 16-bit minicomputer)-The console is also used as an initial program loading device and for diagnostic testing. Whereas the DEC system extended console saturates its processing facility, the Cray system tends to under utilize its console processor. 21 The Amdahl 470 computer system also uses a Data General minicomputer as a processor to drive its console,^The console hardware includes a floppy disk unit and a modem for telecommunication, as well as facilities to support the operator's console.
The circuit components that are used to build the 470 include the capability for an external medium to read out the value of each latch in the hardware.
The first extended capability of the console is to be able to inspect and record each of these latches.
These console facilities are used whenever the hardware fails, i.e. the console scans all latches in the machine and records them on a floppy disk. The floppy disk is then mailed to the Sunnyvale site where it can be analyzed by central site experts The second application of the extended console uses the (1200 baud) modem. If a machine is experiencing a problem that the field engineer cannot diagnose, he initiates a phone connection of the console/host machine to the Sunnyvale (central) facility.
At the central site, another console with a mini computer is used to remotely control the host computer system. Thus, there is no real-time monitoring at 1200 baud, but incremental stepping of the host can be done from the central site.
(Diagnostic software is executed on the remote console processor under the control of the similar central console processor.)
The third application of the console extends the one just described. After a connection is established between the host console and the central console, information routed to the central console is processed locally by a second 470 system.
Full trace data can be analyzed by the central facility in order to isolate circuit failures.
The final example of an extended console is^the Total Remote Assistance Center (TRACE) facility used at Univac.-^'-''^^The central facility is centered around a Univac 1108 in Roseville, Minnesota, which is dedicated to diagnostic assistance for field engineers. The central facility can be used to remotely monitor series 90 systems and 1100 series systems. (The remote monitor for each machine, in each series, is unique to that machine model .
)
The series 90 remote monitors are portable facilities used only during diagnostic testing. The 1110 and 1100/40 are provided with a Maintenance Controller to serve as the remote (programmable hardware) monitor. The Maintenance Controller provides a mechanism for extending the console to the TRACE facility and to run diagnostic tests. The 1100/80 remote monitor contains slightly more capability than the Maintenance Controller, allowing more of the TRACE processing to be performed at the site of the host.
The TRACE facility bears many similarities to the network monitors discussed in the previous subsection.
Although Control Data did not feel that dedicated remote monitors were useful in the context of STAR, Univac has made extensive use of the same technique (so much so that future 22 Univac systems will also include similar facilities'*'^). The most remarkable observation about the TRACE facility is its versatility across a wide variety of machines; the remote monitors have been designed for individual models so that uniform central site processing can be applied to the monitor data.
The remarks at the end of the subsection on network monitors are appropriate for most extended console applications discussed here. The extended consoles are often equivalent to the two-node network (consisting of the host system and the central system). As performance evaluation monitors, the extended console may have inadequate local processing power or be limited in its data transmission bandwidth (e"g. the Honeywell and Digital Equipment facilities). Almost all extended consoles have been specifically designed to perform remote diagnostic capabilities; thus, they are nearly all successful at this aspect of remote monitoring.
As performance assurance and system security remote monitors, the question of appropriateness is still open (as mentioned before).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This report has discussed a wide variety of monitors in the context of remote monitoring. The areas of application have been broadly categorized as performance evaluation, diagnostic testing, performance assurance, and system security monitoring. Monitors have been classified into seven groups, based primarily on their architecture.
Several individual monitors could easily have been placed in more than one category (the categorization really served to compare similar monitors at one time in a single subsection)
.
There is no single best monitoring approach for any given application. The choice of a technique is a function, not only of the broad application area, but also of the particular environment in which the monitor is to operate and the type of data that the monitor will be required to collect. Nevertheless, the following paragraphs address the issue In very general terms.
Remote monitoring for performance evaluation is the most popular application area.
The monitoring technology has grown complex during the ten or fifteen years that local performance monitors have been used, propagating a large set of principles that could be employed in remote monitoring work. Activity has been the highest in the study of computer networks, although that technology is clearly derived from software, programmable hardware, and hybrid monitoring work.
It is also clear that current remote monitor architecture studies have far outstripped the engineering application of the attendant tools.
Existing hybrid and network monitor facilities appear to be capable of gathering measurement data in manners that have not really been effectively used. The tool maker has built a tool that is so complex that workers do not know how to use it effectively.
A few of the toolmakers seem to be aware of this problem and are attempting to remedy the situation by providing better human-engineered monitors. The For the sake of discussion, it is assumed that one may be able to find performance assurance metrics, and that a monitor is needed to obtain the corresponding measures. By the nature of the requirement for performance assurance, one cannot assume that the environment of the host computer is totally friendly (for if it were, performance assurance would be unnecessary). The degree of unfriendliness can vary from situations involving, say, mischievous university students, to the clientele of an Eastern European computing center. Hence, implementation issues must be concerned with the correctness, the logical completeness, and the security of the monitor (especially its remote portion). To minimize the chance of programmable hardware being tampered with, the hardware monitor code should be stored in ROM and/or down loaded from the central facility.
Physical security might be enhanced by embedding the monitor into the other facilities of the host system rather than "locking it up" in a box.
System security is the main issue of the WASSO terminal prototype implementation.
As in performance assurance, questions of monitor consistency, completeness, and security are critical.
Basically, the same observations made about performance assurance monitors also hold for system security monitors. 
